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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STEPHEN MERRILL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.

DOCKET NO. 47511-2019
Kootenai County Case No.
CV28-19-16 95

ERIK P. SMITH,
Defendant/Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

THE HONORABLE LANSING HAYES
District Judge Presiding

STEPHEN MERRILL, ASB No. 911058
Boardwalk Office Suites
201 Barrow St. Ste. 103
Anchorage, AK 99501
Telephone: (907) 771-9900
Facsimile: (800) 585-1463
attymerrill@ anchoragela wyer.us
Pro Se Plaintiff/Appellant

ERIK P. SMITH, ISB No. 5008
LAKE CITY LAW GROUP PLLC
435 W. Hanley Ave., Ste. 101
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Telephone: (208) 664-8115
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338
esmith@lclattorneys.com
Pro Se Defendant/Respondent
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature Of The Case

On March 8, 2019 the Plaintiff, STEPHEN MERRILL ("Merrill") brought his
declaratory judgment action against the Defendant, ERIK P. SMITH ("Smith"), claiming
that Merrill was owed attorneys fees pursuant to a contract with Smith, for Merrill's
representation of former clients, BRADLEY BLITON and SHANNON BLITON ("the
Blitons"), arising from a personal injury case. Smith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
which was granted. Merrill filed a Motion to Reconsider which was denied.

II.

Statement Of Facts

This case was filed as a complaint for declaratory judgment based on an alleged
contract. (See Complaint of Plaintiff, filed herein on March 8, 2019). The unverified
complaint set forth a single cause of action: the alleged attorneys fees agreement
between Merrill and Smith.
Smith filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with three (3) accompanying
affidavits, alleging that no contract existed. Merrill responded in a brief opposing Smith's
Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that there was a written and contractual attorney
fee split between the two attorney firms, and that Merrill's subsequent termination by the
Blitons did nothing to change that agreed-upon fee split. (See Plaintiff's Brief, page 4).
The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, and Merrill filed Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration of Summary Judgment ("Motion to Reconsider"), together with Plaintiff's
Brief in Support of His Motion for Reconsideration ("Brief on Motion to Reconsider'').
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The court found that Merrill only filed three (3) documents: the motion, a notice of
----~h~earing_o n~ajd_rncrtion,_ a_od_his br_iefJn_s__ypport_of the

mo.tlon_.(.Se.e_document_s as filedl----

and Motion to Reconsider Tr., pp. 7-8). In his brief, Merrill alleged that" ... a proposed
First Amended Complaint is filed with this brief." (See Motion to Reconsider Tr., p. 3).
The motion was denied.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the district court correctly grant Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I.

Review Of Order of Summary Judgment - De Novo
"This Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo, and

this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling
on a motion for summary judgment." Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho

391, 394 (2008). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793 (2006). In
addition, this Court must consider I.R.C.P. 56(e), which provides that "the adverse party
may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific
facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Curlee, quoting Rhodehouse v. Stutts,
125 Idaho 208,211 (1994).
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ARGUMENT

I.

There Was No Written ContracfWnich Entitles Merrill to Relief.

The underlying case which was the basis for this claim of attorneys fees was a
personal injury case. Merrill and Smith were both attorneys for the injured parties, the
Blitons. Both attorneys entered into a contingency fee agreement with the Blitons.
Merrill and Smith only tentatively negotiated the co-representation without
formalizing a fee sharing agreement between themselves. It is undisputed that a written
contract between the parties did not exist. The only contracts in existence were the
contingency fee agreements between the Blitons and Merrill, and separately between the
Blitons and Smith.
Merrill even admits that his suit "is not essentially based in breach of contract."
(Brief on Motion to Reconsider, p. 6)

Further on Merrill states "the Plaintiff does not

have available to him a common law breach of contract theory technically, since there
has been no breach of contract. .. " (Brief on Motion to Reconsider, p. 8).
Despite these admissions, the single cause of action was for breach of contract
pursuant to a declaratory judgment action.

However, as set forth in the trial court's

memorandum decision, Merrill failed to proffer any admissible evidence of contract.
(Memorandum Decision, pp. 3 - 4, citing Shacocass, Inc. v. Airington Construction

Company, 116 Idaho 460, 463 (Ct. App. 1989)). Therefore, without any admissible
evidence of contract the trial court properly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment
on that basis.
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II.

Merrill Failed to Plead for Equitable Relief In His Complaint.

_ _ _ _T,_,_h
,'-"--'e=-------=trial co_LJ_~PP-fQP-ria_
tely _d.enie.d_MerriU'_s__claim_for _.egYLtable_relie_
f for s~veraJ __ ___ _
reasons.
Firstly, Merrill failed to plead any facts or reference any law to support any
equitable claim sufficient to meet notice pleading standards. (Memorandum Decision, p.
4 ). Secondly, a complaint for declaratory judgment could not in itself provide notice that
equitable relief was being sought since the relevant statue omits any reference to
equitable claims. See Idaho Code § 10-1202. The authority for a court to make a
declaratory judgment is set forth in I.C. § 10-1202 which states that:
Any person interested a deed, will, written contract or other
writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder.
(Emphasis added). The basic requirement for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act
is the existence of a deed, will, contract, statute, or municipal ordinance. None of these
things are present in this case.

Therefore there is no basis for Merrill's request for

declaratory judgment on his claim.
Thirdly, relief sought upon an implied contract or equitable claim is not appropriate
or allowed in a declaratory judgment. So even if properly pied, the complaint would fail.
(Memorandum of Decision, p. 4).
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Ill.

There Was No Implied Contract.

_ _ -----=O'--'--'n~lyJor__arg_ume_ot's_.sa_ke,

even_ if tbe_C_gµrtJinds_ that_ Merrill is__ enti_tled __tQ___ha_yC-..:e'----"a==-n-=-----

equitable claim or Merrill appears to allege the existence of an implied-in-fact contract
between himself and Smith, this Court may determine that an implied-in-fact contract did
not exist by applying the meeting of the minds requirement in the implied contract context.
An implied-in-fact contract exists where there is no express agreement, but the conduct
of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists. Fox v.
Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 707 (2002). "The general rule is that where

the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's
request and that the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a
contract implied in fact." Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc., v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319,321 (1986). To
find such a contract, the facts must be such that the intent to make a contract can be
inferred from the parties' conduct. Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 891 (Idaho App. 1997).
More specifically, an implied-in-fact agreement must be "founded upon a meeting
of the minds ... inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the
surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding." Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United
States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus an implied-in-fact contract "is one

where the terms ... are manifested by the conduct of the parties ... " Clayson v. Zebe, 280
p.3d 731, 736 (2012). This requires the findings of: 1) mutuality of intent to contract; 2)
consideration; and, 3) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance. El Centro v. United
States, 922 F.2d 816,820 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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A meeting of the minds or mutuality of intent is critical in finding an implied-in-fact
___ --~_ontract. In

B~ker__v_. ___BOLEUJ.JJn_upholdingJhe trials.. court's _find.ing__Q.f_ ~JJJ_mpli_ed:in-:-fact

contract, the Court of Appeals of Idaho noted that the parties each had the same belief
regarding the same underlying contract terms. Id. at 891. In this case, there was no
meeting of the minds or mutuality of intent.
Also critical in finding an implied-in-fact contract is a lack of ambiguity. However,
as set out above, Merrill's alleged agreement is nothing if not ambiguous. Where the
parties and terms of an alleged agreement are entirely ambiguous, as here, there can be
no implied-in-fact contract.

IV.

Merrill's Contract With the Blitons Was Terminated.
Even if this Court strains to find that a contract of some nature did exist, Merrill's

termination by the Blitons precludes him from recovery. Smith pied as an affirmative
defense that, solely due to Merrill's actions Merrill was terminated by the Blitons from
being their attorney. Therefore, any alleged contract with him was also terminated since
he failed to include any contractual terms that his compensation would survive termination
by converting the contingency basis to an hourly basis. (See attachments 1 and 2 to
Merrill's Complaint). In this case, Merrill was terminated by the Blitons in December,
2017. Merrill has admitted that his contract for legal services was terminated by the
Blitons on or around December 6, 2017, and that he performed no additional legal work.
(See Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A (Requests for
Admissions No. 1 and 2)).
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V.

Merrill Failed to Amend His Pleadings.

--~Afte_r_sumrnary jY.dgmenLwas entere_d~_g.ainst. Merrill, _h_ELfiLed ___the MoUon---'t=o_ __
Reconsider, a Notice of Hearing, and the Brief on Motion to Reconsider. (See Motion to
Reconsider Tr. pp 7 -8). In his brief he merely proffered a proposed Amended Complaint.
By this attempted proffering, Merrill acknowledged and admitted that his original
complaint was deficient. However he failed to amend his complaint properly, despite the
trial court's proviso. The trial court stated "there is not a grounds under these procedural
circumstances to just simply allow the filing of an amended complaint that brings forth a
whole new cause of action as a basis for reconsideration of the order granting summary
1

judgment. .. ' (Motion to Reconsider Tr. p. 12). Merrill failed to amend his complaint and
the trial court was correct in its decision.

CONCLUSION

The trial court should be affirmed in its grant of summary judgment.

DATED this ~
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f April, 2020.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
- - - - ---

------·-

--

/May

1hereby certify that on the
of April, 2020, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the methods indicated below, and addressed
to all counsel of record as follows:

STEPHEN MERRILL

- □ U.S. MAIL
□
□

HAND DELIVERED
FACSIMILE
0 ELECTRONIC MAIL

The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief is in compliance
with all the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1, and that an electronic copy was served
on the court and each party at the following email addresses:

Clerk of the Supreme Court

sctbriefs@idcourts.net

Stephen Merrill

attymerrill@anchoragelawyer.us
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